OFW Solar Project Faces Major Interconnection Setback

A single administrative error just cost the OFW Solar Project years.

The Virginia-based solar development submitted its interconnection application to the wrong utility — connecting to transmission lines operated by a power company that doesn't even serve the relevant grid segment — instead of a second set of nearby transmission lines that would have been the correct path. The result: a complete restart of the PJM interconnection process, with construction potentially pushed back to 2032.

That's not a minor delay. That's a project fundamentally reset by a paperwork mistake.

What the OFW Solar Project Was Built to Do

Virginia has been one of the more aggressive states in the Southeast when it comes to clean energy buildout. The Commonwealth's Clean Economy Act set a mandate for Dominion Energy to reach 100% clean electricity by 2045, and utility-scale solar has been a central pillar of that strategy. Projects like OFW represent exactly the kind of private development that's supposed to accelerate that timeline — filling capacity gaps, feeding into the PJM regional grid, and contributing renewable megawatts without requiring ratepayer-funded utility construction.

OFW was positioned to be part of a critical supply wave, coming online as Virginia's demand for clean generation continues to outpace development. The state's data center corridor alone — one of the densest concentrations of hyperscale computing infrastructure in the world — is driving electricity demand at a pace that has utility planners actively worried about near-term capacity shortfalls.

Losing years off the timeline for a project like this isn't just a developer headache. It creates a real gap in a grid that has very little margin for error.

The Interconnection Mistake Explained

Here's where it gets painful to read.

The OFW Solar Project applied to interconnect with the transmission lines of the wrong power company. Two sets of transmission infrastructure run near the project site, and the development team submitted their PJM interconnection application tied to lines operated by a utility that isn't the appropriate interconnecting entity for where OFW actually needs to plug in. The correct path was the second set of nearby lines — different owner, different queue, different process entirely.

PJM's interconnection queue is already one of the most congested in North America. As of recent queue reports, PJM manages requests for thousands of projects totaling hundreds of gigawatts of proposed capacity — the vast majority of which will never reach commercial operation. The queue study process is exhaustive: multiple study phases, cost allocation analyses, and facility upgrade negotiations, each taking months or years. When a project submits to the wrong queue position, it doesn't get reassigned — it starts over.

That's exactly what happened here. OFW must now reenter the PJM interconnection process from the beginning, losing whatever queue position it had previously secured. In a system where queue position is essentially the project's place in line for grid access, that loss translates directly to years of delay. The 2032 construction estimate reflects not just the administrative restart, but the compounding effect of rejoining a line that has grown considerably longer since OFW first applied.

It's worth understanding what "restart" actually means operationally. PJM's queue reforms — implemented under FERC Order 2023 — moved the process toward cluster studies rather than serial individual reviews. That means OFW doesn't just lose time; it loses cluster cohort membership. It has to wait for the next applicable study window, go through feasibility, system impact, and facilities studies again, negotiate any required network upgrades, and then secure a generation interconnection agreement. None of that is fast under even favorable conditions.

Timeline and Financial Fallout

A delay to 2032 is significant in ways that compound beyond the obvious.

Solar project economics are built on a specific financial architecture: construction timelines, equipment procurement windows, power purchase agreements with fixed pricing, and federal tax credit eligibility. The Inflation Reduction Act's investment tax credit structure has been a windfall for utility-scale solar — but those benefits are tied to projects reaching commercial operation within defined windows. A multi-year delay throws all of those calculations into question.

Equipment costs may shift dramatically between now and whenever OFW eventually breaks ground — and not necessarily in the developer's favor. Module prices have been volatile. Tariff policy on solar panels has been in flux, with import duties creating supply chain uncertainty that didn't exist when OFW's original pro forma was modeled. Any PPA the project may have negotiated based on original cost assumptions could end up significantly underwater if input costs rise before construction begins.

Then there's the carrying cost problem. Development capital — land control agreements, permitting work, engineering studies, interconnection deposits — doesn't sit idle for free. Developers pay to hold projects in queue. A forced restart means paying those holding costs for additional years while generating zero revenue. For a project already deep in the development cycle, that's a material financial hit that can threaten viability altogether.

Some projects don't survive this kind of reset. The ones that do typically have either a very well-capitalized sponsor or an offtake partner willing to renegotiate terms — neither of which should be assumed.

What Every Solar Developer Needs to Learn From This

Interconnection applications aren't boilerplate. The decision of *which* transmission owner to apply through — and *which* set of lines to target — is one of the most consequential technical and legal determinations a development team makes. It requires a granular understanding of the local transmission topology, the jurisdictional boundaries between transmission owners, and how PJM's queue rules interact with those ownership distinctions.

The proximity of two transmission systems to a single project site is not an invitation to guess. It's a scenario that demands rigorous due diligence: reviewing transmission owner service territory maps, consulting with PJM's interconnection staff directly during pre-application, and ideally engaging transmission consultants with specific experience in the relevant footprint.

Pre-application meetings with PJM exist precisely to surface these questions before they become fatal errors. Developers who treat that step as optional are taking on risk that the OFW situation now quantifies in painfully concrete terms — potentially years of delay and millions in stranded development costs.

There's a broader systemic point here too. PJM's queue has been under significant reform pressure because of how many projects enter, clog the system, and withdraw. Every restart like OFW's — driven by avoidable errors rather than genuine market dynamics — contributes to that congestion. Other developers in the queue bear a real cost when projects recycle through the system unnecessarily. It's not just OFW's problem. It's an inefficiency that ripples.

For developers, the practical checklist should include: independent verification of the correct transmission owner before any application is filed, a legal review of the interconnection request for jurisdictional accuracy, and a second set of eyes — whether internal or external — specifically assigned to catch this category of error. The cost of that review is trivially small relative to what a mistake at this stage actually costs.

What Comes Next

OFW's path forward exists, but it's narrow and slow. The project will need to navigate a reformed PJM queue that is more rigorous than the one it originally entered, with no guarantee that its previous interconnection study work carries meaningful forward value. Virginia's broader solar pipeline will continue developing around it in the meantime, meaning OFW may find itself competing for the same grid capacity it was originally positioned to access ahead of the market.

The more important question is what this signals for the industry. Virginia solar energy development is not slowing down — if anything, pressure from data center load growth is accelerating the pace at which projects need to come online. That urgency creates exactly the conditions where teams cut corners on due diligence, rush applications, and make preventable errors.

The OFW interconnection mistake is a case study in what happens when speed overrides rigor. The irony is that the shortcut cost years.

Explore more about how to navigate the complexities of solar development and interconnection processes at InfraSale Marketplace.

[INTERNAL LINK: Virginia Solar Development]

[INTERNAL LINK: PJM Interconnection Process]

[INTERNAL LINK: Solar Project Economics]